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Abstract
This paper constructs a model of the monetary economy with multiple nominal
assets. Assets differ in terms of the liquidity services they provide, and money is the
most liquid asset. The central bank can implement policies by adjusting the relative
supply of money and other assets. I show that the central bank can control the overall
liquidity and welfare of the economy by changing the relative supply of assets with
different liquidity characteristics. A liquidity trap exists away from the Friedman rule
that has a positive real interest rate; the central bank’s asset purchase/sale programs
may be ineffective in instances of low enough inflation rates. My model also enables
me to study the welfare effects of a restriction on trading with government bonds.
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1 Introduction
The key tool for implementing monetary policy is the interest rate on overnight loans
between banks. In normal times, this rate is sensitive to the quantity of excess reserves.
A central bank can control the rate on overnight loans by regular open-market operations.
During and after the financial crisis of 2007, many central banks implemented policies that
involved central banks’ participation in a variety of markets. Large-scale asset programs
that change the size and the composition of central banks’ balance sheets were a major
part of these policies. Traditional frictionless models of the monetary economy are not able
to capture the real effects of these policies. Tobin (1969) P. 29 noticed the inability of
traditional monetary models and states “there is no reason to think that the impact [of
monetary policy] will be captured in any single [variable]... whether it is a monetary stock
or a market interest rate”. Later Tobin and Buiter (1981) used the arguments in Tobin
(1969) and state that central banks should actively participate in the private capital market
to impact the economy in the long run. These policies would directly impact rates of return
on capital and therefore affect capital formation. This was the first time that economists
were thinking about unconventional monetary policies. In order to investigate these policies,
we need models with frictions in the asset market. Later economists started to build models
that can generate real effects of central banks’ asset purchase (or sale) programs and are
able to capture the real effects of unconventional monetary policies.
Central banks’ asset purchase programs involve purchasing assets and paying with assets
that are different in terms of the liquidity services they provide. The liquidity characteris-
tics of the central banks’ and households’ balance sheets are affected by this practice. To
investigate the liquidity effects of these policies, I construct a microfounded model of mon-
etary economy where households can trade goods with different types of assets. I use the
theoretical model to show that within a specific set of parameters, open-market operations
may affect the decision of households in the economy and welfare. In these cases, the central
bank can affect the amount of produced goods in the economy by trading illiquid assets with
money. There is an optimum supply of bonds that maximizes welfare in the economy. In an
economy with two types of government-issued assets with different liquidity characteristics,
the central bank is able to use open-market operations to change the liquidity characteristics
of agents’ portfolios. The central bank’s asset purchase/sale programs can improve welfare
by increasing (decreasing) liquidity in periods of low (high) liquidity.
During the period 2008 − 2011 many central banks implemented a series of unconven-
tional monetary policies in response to the financial crisis. A major part of these policies
was the large-scale asset purchase programs (known as quantitative easing). The Bank of
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Japan implemented similar policies from 2000− 20061. These programs are basically open-
market operations that change the size or the composition of central banks’ balance sheets.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve implemented two sets of policies in response to the financial
crisis: 1-Quantitative easing: expanding the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet
by purchasing conventional assets2 and issuing reserves on the liability side. 2-Credit easing:
changing the composition of the Fed’s balance sheet by selling conventional assets and buy-
ing unconventional assets3. While academics discuss several channels through which these
policies can affect the real economy (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)),
policy makers (e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004)) mainly highlight two: 1-Signaling lower
interest rate in the long-term. 2-Increasing demand for other assets in the economy and
decreasing yield on these assets4.
The literature on open-market operations and quantitative easing falls into two categories.
First, there are earlier papers that show open-market operations are irrelevant for the real
economy. In these models assets are perfectly substitutable in terms of liquidity services,
and open-market operations do not change the liquidity characteristics of households’ asset
portfolios. In a model with liquid bonds, since bonds and money are perfectly substitutable,
households have a similar liquidity preference toward holding bonds and money. Households
cannot use bonds to affect the liquidity characteristics of their portfolios. Following Wallace
(1981), a branch of literature uses a Modigliani-Miller argument to show that the size and the
composition of central banks’ balance sheets and thus open-market operations do not have
any real effect on the economy. In order to capture real effects of asset purchase programs,
we need models with frictions in the asset market in which assets are imperfect substitutes.
Second, papers show that open-market operations can affect the real economy. In a model
in which interest bearing assets provide different liquidity services compared to money, open-
market operations change the liquidity characteristics of households’ portfolios and have real
effects on the economy. Kocherlakota (2003) uses a similar argument and shows that in a
centralized market, agents use illiquid bonds to smooth consumption.
1Bernanke et al. (2004), Marumo et al. (2003), Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), Baba et al. (2005), and
Oda and Ueda (2005) study QE in Japan and find similar significant effects on asset prices.
2In the US this mainly takes the form of treasuries.
3Credit easing is also called an asset sterilizing program or Operation Twist. The first studied uncon-
ventional monetary policy is called “operation twist”. In 1961, in response to the recession, the Kennedy
administration and the Federal Reserve decided to flatten the yield curve on treasury debt by keeping the
short-term rate constant and lowering the long-term rates. Under this policy the Federal Reserve kept its
federal funds rate constant and purchased long-term Treasury debt and agency-backed private debt. On
the other side, the Treasury reduced its issuance of long-term debt and increased its issuance of short-term
debt. These policies affected the short-term and long-term rates, agency, and the corporate bond market
(Modigliani and Sutch (1966), Modigliani and Sutch (1967) and Swanson et al. (2011) discuss these policies.)
4Agents rebalanced their portfolios towards other assets in the economy.
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Curdia and Woodford (2011) add an intermediary sector to a canonical New Keynesian
model5. The model in Curdia and Woodford (2011) is able to analyze three separate central
banks’ policies regarding quantity of reserves, interest paid on reserves, and the combination
of central banks’ balance sheets. This allows them to study a rich set of central bank policies.
They find that quantitative easing in the strict sense is likely to be ineffective. Williamson
(2012) adds an intermediary sector6 to a New Monetarist monetary framework7. In a version
of the model with public and private assets, Williamson (2012) shows that a policy similar to
the first round of quantitative easing pursued by the Federal Reserve is, at best, ineffective.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) study a model of monetary economy with differences in liquidity
across assets. They show that open-market operations are effective when the central bank
purchases the assets with partial resaleability and a substantial liquidity premium during
negative liquidity shocks. The illiquid asset in their model are mainly capital and securities
that are issued based on capital, and their analysis focuses on the role of open-market
operations on privately provided liquidity.
I expand the existing literature on the effects of open-market operations by building a
micro-founded model of a monetary economy. The basic model is a variation of Shi (2008),
who uses a similar framework to study the legal restrictions on trade with nominal bonds.
Agents can trade with different government-issued assets that provide different liquidity
services. Contrary to Shi (2008), here the argument is not based on parameters in the utility
function. Shi (2008) assumes that agents can use bonds to trade certain types of goods that
yield a higher utility when consumed. Here, consumption of different goods yield the same
amount of utility and my analysis hinges on the liquidity characteristics of assets. Assets
are different in terms of the liquidity services they provide. Central bank’s open-market
purchase of assets increases liquidity in the economy by injecting money and purchasing
interest-bearing assets.
How does this model investigate the liquidity effects of central bank’s policies? First, I
use a household structure, which helps to build a tractable model that avoids the evolving
distribution of asset holding. In this structure, households do not face any intertemporal
uncertainty. Therefore, there is no precautionary motive for saving. Households buy assets
only for the liquidity services they provide. The yield on assets is a pure liquidity premium.
Second, I model liquidity services provided by assets. Households do not gain utility by
holding assets. This allows me to investigate the effects of different central policies on the
liquidity premium on assets and the overall welfare in the economy.
5Similar to the framework in Woodford (2011)
6Williamson (2012) uses a model based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
7A model based on Lagos and Wright (2005) with heterogeneous agents similar to Rocheteau and Wright
(2005).
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In the literature on monetary economics and policy liquidity traps are mostly associated
with the Friedman rule8. Williamson (2012) studies a liquidity trap in cases where the
economy is away from the Friedman rule and when the real interest rate is zero. He discusses
the liquidity channel of open-market operations in a model with public and private liquidity
in which it is costly to operate a monetary system. In this paper, we can have the properties
of the liquidity trap equilibrium when the real interest rate is positive. In this case, marginal
open-market operations do not have real effects on the economy. In an extension of the
model with three assets I show that a policy of credit easing can affect welfare.
In section 2, I develop a micro-founded model of the monetary economy. I then study
the optimal choices and discuss different equilibria and welfare effects of different policies.
In section 3, I study the model with two types of government issued assets. Section 4 offers
concluding remarks and possible extensions.
2 Model environment
Time is discrete and has infinite horizons. There are H types of households (H ≥ 3).
Each household consumes a good that is produced by some other type of household, type
h household consumes good h but produces good h + 1. There is no double coincidence of
wants, and goods are perishable. Each household consists of a large number of members
(measure one). These members could be sellers (measure σ), buyers (measure N − σ), or
leisure seekers (measure 1 − N). Buyers and sellers trade goods while leisure seekers are
inactive. There is perfect consumption insurance between household members; members of
a household share consumption and regard utility of the household as the common objective.
There are two markets in this economy, a centralized market for assets and a decentralized
market for goods. Money and bonds are supplied by the central bank. The central bank
implements policies by printing money at rate γ and changing the relative composition
of the stock of bonds and money in the economy. In the centralized market for assets, the
government bonds are sold for money. In the decentralized market for goods, search frictions
exist. Buyers and sellers of different households are randomly matched in pairs. The number
of matches for each household is αN , where α is a parameter of the environment and N is
the aggregate number of traders in the market. According to this matching technology, the
matching rate for buyers is αN
N−σ and the matching rate for the sellers is
αN
σ
9. The matching
process of a three household economy is shown in figure 1. Because of the assumed structure
of the environment, a successful match is between a buyer of household “h” and a seller of
8Money grows at the rate that agents discount future consumption.
9I assume α is low enough that matching rates are less than 1.
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household “h+ 1.”
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Figure 1: Matching process in a 3 household economy
In the centralized market for assets, households trade government bonds for money. In
the decentralized market for goods, household members trade goods for money or government
bonds. Trade history is private information, agents are anonymous, and the population is
large. Therefore, there is no credit. After household members are matched, a matching
shock determines the type of assets they can use for trade. With probability 1 − l, they
can only use money (this trade is indexed by subscript “m”) to purchase goods, and with
probability l they can use both money and bonds (this trade is indexed by subscript “b”) to
purchase goods10.
2.1 Household decisions
The representative household solves the following maximization problem:
v(m, b) = max
ci,qi,xi,n,m+1,b+1,
{u(cm)− αN(1− l)ψ(Qm)
+u(cb)− αNlψ(Qb) + h(1− n) + βv(m+1, b+1)}, i ∈ {m, b} (1)
10Different types of matches can be interpreted as “monitored” and “non-monitored” matches as in
Williamson (2012).
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subject to the following constrains:
xm ≤ m
n− σ , (2)
xb ≤ m+ b
n− σ , (3)
where lower case letters are choices of the household under consideration and capital letters
are per capita variables that individual households cannot affect.
Households choose consumption (ci), terms of trade (qi, xi), number of traders (n), and
asset portfolio (m+1, b+1) for the next period to maximize the above value function. The
utility from trade is the sum of the net utility in each type of trade. In each trade, household
shares the utility from consumption of the purchased goods and the cost of production of
the sold goods. In a money trade a representative household consumes cm and produces
Qm. The total number of money trades for the representative household is αN(1 − l).
Similarly, in a money and bond trade, a representative household consumes cb and prodeces
Qb. Since buyers have all the bargaining power, the amount sold is shown by capital letters
Qi. u() is continuous and twice differentiable, and u
′() > 0, u′′() < 0. I assume ψ′() > 0,
ψ′′() > 0; h′() > 0 and h′′() < 0. Each household divides its members into three groups:
sellers/producers (measure σ), buyers (measure n− σ), and leisure seekers (measure 1− n).
Households choose n, and σ is fixed11. In each type of trade, buyers are constrained by the
portfolio of assets that they have. In a money trade, buyers are constrained by the amount
of money they have (2). In a money and bond trade, buyers are constrained by the total
portfolio of assets they carry(3). Goods are divisible and perishable. Consumption in each
type of trade is the matching rate times the total amount of goods bought by the buyers in
that trade
cb =
αN
(N − σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matching rate
(n− σ)lqb
cm =
αN(n− σ)(1− l)
(N − σ) qm.
Let us define ωi, i ∈ {m, b} as the marginal value of assets
ωm =
β
γ
∂v(m, b)
∂m+1
11This assumption is for simplicity. I can allow households to choose σ and the main results hold.
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ωb =
β
γ
∂v(m, b)
∂b
.
Ωm is the per capita value of money in the economy. In each trade, sellers sell goods for
a portfolio of assets, which has a marginal value of Ωm. Seller’s surplus is xiΩm−ψ(qi), i ∈
{m, b}. Since buyers have all the bargaining power, the offer sets sellers’ surplus to 0. Thus,
the participation constraint is xiΩm − ψ(qi) = 0, and can be written as:
xi = ψ(qi)/Ωm i ∈ {m, b}. (4)
The value of household’s asset portfolio in terms of money follows equation 5:
(m+1 + s+1b+1 + T+1)γ =
m+ b+ αNlXb + αN(1− l)Xm − αN(n− σ)
N − σ lx
b − αN(n− σ)
N − σ (1− l)x
m, (5)
where s+1 is the price of bond in the asset market. Money balance plus the amount spent
on the assets in the next period and the tax (or transfers) is equal to the portfolio of assets
in the current period plus the assets that the sellers bring back minus the assets that buyers
have spent on their purchases of goods.
2.1.1 Timing
The timing of the events is shown in figure 2.
t t+1Government:
• transfers
• prints money
• redeems
bonds
• issues bonds
Asset market
Asset portfolio
(m, b)
Choices:
n, (xi, qi)
Frictional market
Matching shocks
Trade in goods Consumption
Figure 2: Timing
At the beginning of each period, the asset market opens. Households redeem nominal
bonds from the previous period for one unit of money, trade assets for money, receive transfer
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T , and adjust their portfolios to (m, b). The asset market is closed until the beginning of the
next period. Households choose the amount of total traders n and give buyers instructions
on how to trade in different types of trade (Goods: qi, assets: xi, i ∈ {m, b}). Buyers and
sellers search in the goods market and match according to the linear matching function.
Matched sellers produce and trade and then bring goods and assets back to the household
and members of the household share consumption.
2.2 Optimal choices
The first order condition for qi is
u′(ci) = (ωm + λi)
ψ′(qi)
Ω
i ∈ {b,m}, (6)
where λb and λm are the Lagrange multipliers on trades with bond and money, respectively.
I can solve for bond prices by taking the first order conditions with respect to b:
b+1 : s+1 =
ωb
ωm
. (7)
Households’ choices of the measure of traders (n) solves the following:
h′(1− n) = αN
N − σ
[
lu′(cb)(qb − ψ(qb)
ψ′(qb)
) + (1− l)u′(cm)(qm − ψ(qm)
ψ′(qm)
)
]
. (8)
The envelope conditions for m+1, b+1 are:
m+1 :
γ
β
ωm−1 = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
b +
αN(1− l)
N − σ λ
m (9)
b+1 :
γ
β
ωb−1 = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
b. (10)
At the end of each period, each unit of bond is redeemed for a unit of money, therefore
the value of an asset is the value of money in the following period plus the liquidity services
that the asset provides, accounting for discounting and inflation. Money provides liquidity
services in all types of trades, and bonds are used in certain types of trade. Expressions 9
and 10 show that money has a liquidity premium over bonds.
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2.3 Definition of the equilibrium
Definition 1 An equilibrium is households’ choices (ci∈{m,b}, qi∈{m,b}, xi∈{m,b}, n,m−1, b+1),
the value function (v(m, b)), shadow value of assets (ωm, ωb), asset price (s), and other
households’ choices, such that
1. Given bond price (s), and choices of others, household choices are optimal (1).
2. The choices and shadow prices are the same across households, i.e., qi = Qi, xi =
X i, n = N,ωi = Ωi.
3. Bonds market clear (b = B).
4. Positive and finite values of assets (0 < ω <∞).
5. Stationarity: quantities and prices are constant over time.
2.4 Welfare analysis
The envelope conditions show that the only point at which all of the constraints are non-
binding is where γ = β. Let us call the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint of a money
trade λm and similarly the Lagrange multiplier on a constraint of a bond and money trade
λb.
Lemma 1 At Friedman rule (γ = β), λm = λb = 0. For γ > β, ∃i ∈ {m, b} such that
λi > 0.
In order to study open-market operations, let us define the ratio of stock of bonds to
stock of money as:
z =
B
M
.
The central bank implements policies by changing the inflation rate (γ) and relative
supply of assets (z). Changes in z are the effects of open-market operations. Open-market
purchase (sale) of bonds decreases (increases) z.
I define the welfare function as the utility function of a representative household.
w = u(cb)− αNlψ(Qb) + u(cm)− αN(1− l)ψ(Qm) + h(1− n). (11)
By using the above measure of welfare, I can study the welfare effects of policies. We have
four types of equilibria based on the set of binding liquidity constraints. The only point at
which all of the liquidity constraints are non-binding is at the Friedman rule. The Friedman
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rule is shown to be optimal in a wide variety of models. As the next proposition shows, the
Friedman rule is optimal in this framework.
Proposition 1 The Friedman rule is optimal.
The proof of the above proposition is intuitive. Since buyers’ bargaining power is 1,
households send too many buyers compared to the planner’s choice. Increasing γ punishes
unmatched buyers and the representative households. On the other hand, inflation decreases
the amount of goods in each trade. The former effect is known as the extensive margin of
trade, and the latter is known as the intensive margin of trade. Both intensive margin (q)
and extensive margin (n) decrease with inflation (γ). The planner chooses the lowest possible
level for γ to maximize welfare. Therefore, the Friedman rule is optimal.
Based on the set of liquidity constraints that are binding, we can have four types of
equilibria. As shown before, an equilibrium where both of the liquidity constraints are non-
binding can only happen at the Friedman rule and this equilibrium is efficient. In Appendix
A, I have characterized different types of equilibria and proved the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Open-market operations can only have welfare effects when both of the liq-
uidity constraints are binding. The properties of the equilibria are shown in table 2.
Table 1: Different types of equilibria for a 2-asset economy
Case λm λb s ∂W
∂z
I + 0 β
γ
0
II 0 + 1 0
III + + β
γ
< s < 1 +,−
IV 0 0 1 0
According to proposition 2, marginal open market operations may have real effects when
we have a type III equilibrium. the central bank’s asset purchase/sale programs may be
ineffective in other cases. The literature calles these situations “liquidity traps”. In the
literature on monetary economics and policy, liquidity traps are mostly associated with the
Friedman rule (type IV equilibrium where γ = β). Williamson (2012) studies liquidity traps
in cases where the economy is away from the Friedman rule and when the real interest rate
is zero. In this paper, we can have properties of the liquidity trap equilibrium even when
the real interest rate is positive12. In an equilibrium where only the money constraint is
12The nominal interest rate is 1s . The real interest rate is the difference between the nominal interest rate
an the inflation rate
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binding (Case I), open-market operations have no real effects on the economy and the real
interest rate is positive (s = β
γ
). In this case, marginal open-market operations do not have
real effects on the economy.
2.5 Numerical example
Using the following functional forms and parameters, I simulate the model. The cal-
culations of the different types of equilibria are in the Appendix B and the results of the
simulation are reported in figures 3 and 4:
u(c) = log(c); ψ(q) =
q2
2
; h(n) = 2a(n)1/2,
where a is a parameter of the model. Table 2 shows the properties of the equilibrium for
different amounts of the liquidity parameter (l).
Table 2: Properties of the equilibrium for a 2-asset economy
Case λm λb Criteria
I + 0 l > l =
( γ
β
−1)(N−σ)+αN
(2+z)αN
II 0 + l < l =
αN−( γ
β
−1)(N−σ)(1+z)
αN(2+z)
III + + l ≤ l ≤ l
IV 0 0 N/A
Figure 3 shows the range of parameters for different types of equilibria. For high enough
values of l, the liquidity constraint for money binds and the constraint on trade with bond
is slack. For low enough l, the constraint on bond binds and for l < l < l both of the
constraints are binding.
As I have proven in Proposition 2, increasing z will only affect welfare when we are in
type III equilibrium with both liquidity constraints binding. Figure 4 shows the welfare
properties of the equilibrium for values of l that cause both liquidity constraints binding
(type III equilibrium). As shown in figure 4, for each inflation rate there exists an optimal
level of bond supply (z) that maximizes welfare.
2.5.1 The case for legal restrictions on trading with bonds
As shown in figure 4, in a type II equilibrium, increasing z from zero increases the overall
welfare. Similar to the argument in Shi (2008), an increase in z can be interpreted as
imposing legal restrictions on trade with bonds. An economy with zero supply of bond is a
12
Figure 3: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for a 2-asset economy
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Figure 4: Welfare effects of open-market operations
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pure monetary economy. An increase in z from zero represents imposing legal restrictions
on trades with bonds. As figure 4 shows, this can improve welfare for a range of parameters.
Contrary to the argument in Shi (2008), the argument here is not based on parameters
in the utility function. Shi (2008) assumes that agents can use bond to trade certain types
of goods that yield a higher utility when consumed. Here, consumption of different goods
yields the same amount of utility.
3 Model with 3 assets
In this section, I add a third asset to the model. This extension of the model allows me
to study the effects of a change in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet on the
real economy. All three assets provide liquidity services, and, similar to the previous section,
money is the most liquid asset in the economy. I call the least liquid asset in the economy
“long-term bond” and the other asset “short-term bond.”13 The matching shock works as
follows:
• Shock n: With probability l, agents can trade with money and short term bond and
long term bond.
• Shock s: With probability k, agents can trade with money and short term bond.
• Shock l: With probability 1− l − k, agents can only trade with money.
In each trade buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers on the amount of goods qi∈{n,s,l} and
the portfolio of assets to be traded for goods xi∈{n,s,l}. Note that the portfolio of assets could
be a combination of money, short-term bond, and long-term bond depending on the type of
trade/shock.
Households solve the following maximization problem:
v(m, bl, bs) = max
ci∈{n,s,l},qi∈{n,s,l},xi∈{n,s,l},n,m−1,bs−1,b
l
+1
{u(cl)− αN(1− l − k)ψ(Ql)
+u(cs)− αNkψ(Qs) + u(cn)− αNlψ(Qn)
+h(1− n) + βv(m−1, bl+1, bs+1)}. (12)
13Here, it is assumed that a short-term bond is more liquid than a long-term bond. A short-term bond
can be used in more transactions to purchase goods.
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subject to the following constraints:
xn ≤ m+ bl + bs
n− σ (13)
xs ≤ m+ bs
n− σ (14)
xl ≤ m
n− σ . (15)
According to constraints 13, 14 and 15, in each type of trade (money and short-term bond
trade, money and long-term bond trade, and money trade), buyers are constrained by the
portfolio of assets that they have. Consumption in each type of trade is characterized by the
following:
cn =
αN(n− σ)l
(N − σ) qn
cs =
αN(n− σ)k
(N − σ) qs
cl =
αN(n− σ)(1− k − l)
(N − σ) ql.
where αN
(N−σ) is the matching rate and (n−σ)l, (n−σ)k and (n−σ)(1−k− l) are the number
of buyers in each type of trade.
Let’s define ωi i ∈ {m, bs, bl} as the marginal value of assets
ωm =
β
γ
∂
∂m+1
v(m, bl, bs)
ωbs =
β
γ
∂
∂bs+1
v(m, bl, bs)
ωbl =
β
γ
∂
∂bl+1
v(m, bl, bl).
Since buyers have all the bargaining power, the offer sets sellers’ surplus to 0. Thus, the
participation constraint is:
xi = ψ(qi)/Ωm i ∈ {l, s, n}. (16)
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The value of household’s asset portfolio in terms of money follows equation 17.
(m−1 + sl+1b
l
+1 + s
s
+1b
s
+1 + T−1)γ =
m+ bl + bs + αNlX
n + αNkXs + αN(1− k − l)X l
−αN(n− σ)
N − σ lx
n − αN(n− σ)
N − σ kx
s − αN(n− σ)
N − σ (1− l − k)x
l. (17)
where sl+1 and s
s
+1 are the prices of long-term bonds and short-term bonds respectively.
αNlXn + αNkXs + αN(1− k − l)X l is the amount of assets that households’ sellers spend
and αN(n−σ)
N−σ lx
n − αN(n−σ)
N−σ kx
s − αN(n−σ)
N−σ (1− l− k)xl is the amount of asets that households’
buyers buy.
3.1 Optimal choices
The first order condition for qi is:
u′(ci) = (ωm + λi)
ψ′(qi)
Ω
i ∈ l, s, n. (18)
I can solve for bond prices by taking the first order conditions with respect to b+l , b
+
s .
bl+1 : s
l
+1 =
ωbl
ωm
. (19)
bs+1 : s
s
+1 =
ωbs
ωm
. (20)
The envelope conditions for m+1, b
s
+1, b
l
+1 are:
m+1 :
γ
β
ω−1m = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
n +
αNk
N − σλ
s +
αN(1− l − k)
N − σ λ
l (21)
bs+1 :
γ
β
ω−1bs = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
n +
αNk
N − σλ
s (22)
bl+1 :
γ
β
ω−1bl = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
n. (23)
At the end of each period, each asset is redeemed for a unit of money, therefore the value
of an asset is the value of money in the next period plus the transaction services of each asset
accounting for discounting and inflation. Money provides transaction service in all types of
trades, but bonds are used as medium of exchange in certain types of trade. Similar to the
2-asset economy, the Friedman rule (γ = β) is optimal. Here, the central bank has 3 policy
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variables: money growth rate (γ), long-term bond supply (zl =
Bl
M
), and short-term bond
supply (zs =
Bs
M
).
In order to study the different equilibria and welfare effects of policy, I will focus on the
log-utility and quadratic cost functions:
u(c) = log(c)
ψ(q) = q2/2.
Lemma 2 With u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2, N = n is the same for different cases of
equilibrium. An equilibrium exists if h′(1−N) = 3
2(N−σ) has a real solution for N .
With log-utility and quadratic cost functions, the first order condition for n becomes
h′(1 − N) = 3
2(N−σ) in all of the cases. These functional forms shut down variations in the
extensive margin of trade.
In the next proposition, I characterize these different types of equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Eight types of equilibrium exist, all of which have different sets of binding
liquidity constraints, as defined in table 3.
Table 3: Different types of equilibria for the 3-asset economy
I II III IV V VI VII IIX
λn + 0 + + 0 0 + 0
λs 0 + + 0 0 + + 0
λl + + 0 0 + 0 + 0
The properties of these equilibria are summarized in table 4.
As the proposition shows, in equilibriums with at least two binding liquidity constraints,
there exists a set of parameters that indicate that open-market operations affect welfare.
In these cases, replacing less liquid bonds in household portfolios with liquid money would
increase the intensive margin of trade and welfare.
Table 4 also shows that a policy of changing the relative supply of bonds while keeping
the size of the central bank’s balance sheet growing with the rate of inflation can affect the
overall welfare when we have a type II or VII equilibrium. Credit easing can be implemented
by changing the relative supply of bonds while the following relationship holds
sldzl + ssdzs = 0
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Table 4: Properties of the equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
Case Prices ∂qi
∂zi
∂W
∂zi
I β/γ < sl = ss < 1
∂qs
∂zi
= 0 ∂qn
∂zi
> 0 ∂ql
∂zi
< 0 ∂W
∂zi
>=< 0
II sl = β/γ < ss < 1
∂qn
∂zl
= 0 ∂ql
∂zs
< 0 ∂qs
∂zs
>=< 0 ∂W
∂zl
= 0 ∂W
∂zs
>=< 0
III β/γ < sl < ss = 1
∂ql
∂zi
= 0 ∂qs
∂zs
> 0 ∂qs
∂zl
< 0 ∂qn
∂zi
>=< 0 ∂W
∂zi
>=< 0
IV sl = ss = 1 0 0
V sl = ss = β/γ < 1 0 0
VI sl = β/γ < ss = 1 0 0
VII β/γ < sl < ss < 1
∂qj
∂zi
>=< 0 ∂W
∂zi
>=< 0
IIX sl = ss = 1 0 0
The above relationship allows the central bank to keep the size of its balance sheet growing
at rate γ14.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show different types of equilibria for different bond supply (zs, zl) and
inflation rates (γ).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a model of the monetary economy in which different assets pro-
vide liquidity services. Adding illiquid nominal bonds to a microfounded model of monetary
economy allows me to study the welfare effects of central banks asset purchase programs. I
show that the central bank can change the overall liquidity and welfare in the economy by
changing the relative supply of assets with different liquidity characteristics. My model also
enables me to study the welfare effects of a restriction on trade with government bonds. I
show that in a non-empty set of parameters restricting trade with government bonds can
affect welfare. A liquidity trap can exist away from the Friedman rule and with a positive
real interest rate. One possible extension of the model is to add privately issued assets to
the model and investigate the liquidity effects of a richer set of central banks’ asset purchase
(or sale) programs.
14An example of a policy of credit easing in a type II equilibrium is
β
γ
dzl + sldzs = 0
This policy has real effects on the economy and the central bank keeps the size of its balance sheet growing
at a constant rate.
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Figure 5: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
(zs = zl = 0.7)
Appendix
A The 2-asset economy
I characterize 3 cases of the equilibria based on the set of liquidity constraints that are
binding. In all of these cases at least one of the constraints are binding. The case where
none of them are binding only happens at the Friedman rule, and it is shown to be efficient.
Case I: λm > 0 and λb = 0
The first order conditions are
u′(cb) = ψ′(qb)
u′(cm) = ψ′(qm) +
ψ′(qm)
Ωm
λm
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Figure 6: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
(zs = 2.7, zl = 0.7)
I can rewrite the above equation as
λm = (
u′(cm)
ψ(qb)
− 1)Ωm
Envelope condition gives
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αN(1− l)
N − σ
[
(
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1)Ωm
]
By applying stationarity, I can write the envelope as
γ
β
− 1 = αN(1− l)
N − σ [
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1]
The price for nominal bond is
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Figure 7: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
(zs = 0.7, zl = 2.7)
s =
ωb
ωm
=
β
γ
Case II: λm = 0 and λb > 0
The first order conditions are
u′(cm) = ψ′(qm)
λb = (
u′(cb)
ψ(qb)
− 1)Ωb
Envelope condition gives
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αNl
N − σ
[
(
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1)Ωb
]
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The price for the nominal bond is 1. By applying stationarity, I can write the envelope
as
γ
β
− 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1]
It is straightforward to see that changing z would not affect households’ decision and
welfare when at least one of the liquidity constraints is not binding.
Case III: λm > 0 and λb > 0
The first order conditions are
λm = (
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1)Ωm
λb = (
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1)Ωm
Envelope conditions give
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αNl
N − σ
[(
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
)
Ωm
]
+
αN(1− l)
N − σ
[(
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1
)
Ωm
]
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αNl
N − σ
[(
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
)
Ωm
]
By applying stationarity, I can write the envelope conditions as
γ
β
s− 1 = αNl
N − σ
[
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
]
γ
β
− 1 = αNl
N − σ
[
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
]
+
αN(1− l)
N − σ
[
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1
]
It is straightforward to see that changing z affects the decisions of households and has
real effects on the economy.
B Numerical example for the 2-asset economy
I solve the model for the following functional forms
u(c) = log(c)
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ψ(q) =
q2
2
h(n) = 2an1/2
Now I solve the model for 3 different cases of liquidity constrains
Case I:
qb =
1
(αNl)1/2
qm =
1(
( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αN(1− l)
)1/2
a
(1−N)1/2 = N − σ
By using the constraints it is straightforward to show that this equilibrium happens for
high enough l
l > l =
( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αN
(2 + z)αN
Case II:
qm =
1
(αN(1− l))1/2
qb =
1(
( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αNl
)1/2
a
(1−N)1/2 = N − σ
By using the constraints it is straightforward to show that this equilibrium happens for
low enough l
l < l =
αN − ( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ)(1 + z)
αN(2 + z)
Case III:
qm =
1(
γ
β
(1− s)(N − σ) + αN(1− l)
)1/2
qb =
1(
( γ
β
s− 1)(N − σ) + αNl
)1/2
s =
γ
β
(N − σ) + αN(1− l) + (1 + z)(N − σ − αNl)
γ
β
(2 + z)(N − σ)
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a(1−N)1/2 = N − σ
C The 3-asset economy
Define
ζ(qi) = ψ
′(qi)qi − ψ(qi) i ∈ {l, s, n}
In what follows I solve the problem in different cases of equilibrium.
Cases:
I: λs = 0 < λn, λl
From the envelope conditions it follows
ss = sl < 1
The first order conditions are
u′(cs) = ψ′(qs)
γ
β
ss − 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− ss) = αN(1− l − k)
N − σ [
u′(cl)
ψ′(ql)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = (γ
β
ss − 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) +
αNk
N − σζ(qs) +
(
γ
β
(1− ss) + αN(1− k − l)
N − σ )ζ(ql)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
ss − 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
The solution to the above equations is
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ss =
1 + βαN(1−l−k)
γ(N−σ) + β/γ(1 + zs + zl)(1− αNlN−σ )
2 + zl + zs
1/q2n =
αN(1− l − k) + γ/β(N − σ) + αNl − (1 + zl + zs)(N − σ)
2 + zl + zs
1/q2l =
1 + zl + zs
2 + zl + zs
(αN(1− k) + (N − σ)(γ/β − 1))
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
1 + zl + zs
(1 + zs)(2 + zl + zs) + (1 + zl + zs)
(1 +
N − σ
αN
(γ/β − 1)) ≤ k
(1 + zl + zs)(1 +
N−σ
αN
(γ/β − (1 + zs + zl)))
(1 + zs)(2 + zl + zs) + (1 + zl + zs)
≤ k
The left hand side of the second equation is greater than the first.
II: λn = 0 < λs, λl
sl = β/γ < ss < 1
u′(cn) = ψ′(qn)
γ
β
ss − 1 = αNk
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− ss) = αN(1− l − k)
N − σ [
u′(cl)
ψ′(ql)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNl
N − σζ(qn) + (
γ
β
ss − 1 + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs) +
(
γ
β
(1− ss) + αN(1− k − l)
N − σ )ζ(ql)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = (
γ
β
ss − 1)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = αNl
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1/q2l =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
The solution to the above equations is
ss =
1 + αN(1−l−k)
N−σ β/γ − (αNk − β/γ)(1 + zs)
2 + zs
1/q2s =
αN(1− l) + (1 + zs)(αNK(1− γ/β(N − σ))− (N − σ))− (N − σ)(γ/β − 1)
2 + zs
1/q2l =
1 + zs
2 + zs
(γ/β(N − σ)(1− αNk) + αN(1− l − k)− (N − σ))
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
k ≤ ((1 + zs + zl)(2 + zs) + 1 + zs)l − (1 + zs)(1−
N−σ
αN
(γ/β − 1)) + (1+zs)2(N−σ)
αN
(1 + zs)2(1− γ/β(N − σ))
(1 + N−σ
αN
(γ/β − 1))(1 + zs)− ((2 + zs)(1 + zl + zs) + (1 + zs)l)
(1 + γ/β(N − σ))(1 + zs) ≤ k
III: λl = 0 < λn, λs
sl < ss = 1
u′(cl) = ψ′(ql)
γ
β
sl − 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− sl) = αNK
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αN(1− k − l)
N − σ ζ(ql) + (
γ
β
sl − 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) +
(
γ
β
(1− sl) + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
27
1/q2s =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
ss − 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l = αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
And by some algebra
sl =
(1 + zs)(1 +
αNk
N−σβ/γ)− β/γ( αNkN−σ − 1)(1 + zs + zl)
2 + 2zs + zl
1/q2l = γ/β(N − σ) + αNk −
(1 + zs)(γ/β(N − σ) + αNk)− (αNl − (N − σ))(1 + zl + zs)
2 + 2zs + zl
1/q2n =
αN(1 + zs)(k + l)− (N − σ)(1 + zl + zs)(γ/β − 1)
2 + 2zs + zl
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
k + l ≤ (2 + 2zs + zl) +
N−σ
αN
(1 + zs + zl)
2(γ/β − 1)
(1 + zs)(1 + zs + zl) + (2 + 2zs + zl)
((1 + zs)(1 + zs + zl) + 2 + 2zs + zl)k + (−(1 + zs)(1 + zs + zl) + 2 + 2zs + zl)l ≤
2 + 2zs + zl − (1 + zs + zl)(1 + zs)(N − σ
αN
(γ/β + 1))
IV: λs = λl = 0 < λn
sl = ss = 1
u′(cl) = ψ′(ql)
u′(cs) = ψ′(qs)
γ
β
− 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
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h′(1−N) = αNk
N − σζ(qs) + (
γ
β
− 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) +
αN(1− k − l)
N − σ ζ(ql)
As the above equations show, marginal open-market operations (small changes in zs and
zl) do not change the real decisions of the households and welfare. Solution for u(c) = log(c)
and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l = αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
(γ/β − 1)(N − σ
αN
)(1 + zs + zl) ≤ (1 + zs)k − (1 + zs + zl)l
(2 + zs + zl)l + k ≤ 1− (1 + zs + zl)(γ/β − 1)N − σ
αN
V: λs = λn = 0 < λl
sl = ss = β/γ < 1
u′(cn) = ψ′(qn)
u′(cs) = ψ′(qs)
γ
β
− 1 = αN(1− k − l)
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNl
N − σζ(qn) + (
γ
β
− 1 + αN(1− k − l)
N − σ )ζ(ql) +
αNk
N − σζ(qs)
As the above equations show, marginal open-market operations (small changes in zs and zl)
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do not change the real decisions of the households and welfare.
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = αNk
1/q2n = αNl
1/q2l = (
γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium:
1 + (γ/β − 1)N − σ
αN
≤ (2 + zs + zl)l + k
1 + (γ/β − 1)(N − σ
αN
) ≤ (2 + zs)k + l
VI: λn = λl = 0 < λs
sl = β/γ < ss = 1
u′(cn) = ψ′(qn)
u′(cl) = ψ′(ql)
γ
β
− 1 = αNk
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNl
N − σζ(qn) + (
γ
β
− 1 + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs) +
αN(1− k − l)
N − σ ζ(ql)
As the above equations show, marginal open-market operations (small changes in zs and zl)
do not change the real decisions of the households and welfare.
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2:
1/q2s = (
γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αNk
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1/q2n = αNl
1/q2l = αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium:
(2 + zs)k + l ≤ 1− (γ/β − 1)N − σ
αN
(1 + zs)
(γ/β − 1)(N − σ
αN
)(1 + zs) ≤ (1 + zs + zl)l − (1 + zs)k
VII: 0 < λs, λl, λn
sl < ss < 1
γ
β
sl − 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
γ
β
(ss − sl) = αNk
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− ss) = αN(1− l − k)
N − σ [
u′(cl)
ψ′(ql)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = (γ
β
sl − 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) + (
γ
β
(ss − sl) + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs) +
(
γ
β
(1− ss) + αN(1− l − k)
N − σ )ζ(ql)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2:
1/q2s =
γ
β
(ss − sl)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
sl − 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
31
References
Baba, Naohiko, Shinichi Nishioka, Nobuyuki Oda, Masaaki Shirakawa, Kazuo Ueda, and
Hiroshi Ugai (2005) “Japan’s deflation, problems in the financial system and monetary
policy.” 3
Bernanke, Ben, Vincent Reinhart, and Brian Sack (2004) “Monetary policy alternatives at
the zero bound: An empirical assessment,” Brookings papers on economic activity, Vol.
2004, No. 2, pp. 1–100. 3
Bernanke, Ben S. and Vincent R. Reinhart (2004) “Conducting Monetary Policy at Very
Low Short-Term Interest Rates,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp.
85–90, May. 3
Curdia, Vasco, V.dia and Michael Woodford (2011) “The central-bank balance sheet as an
instrument of monetarypolicy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 54–79.
3, 4
Diamond, Douglas W and Philip H Dybvig (1983) “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liq-
uidity,” The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 401–419. 4
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore (2012) “Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Pol-
icy,” February. Working paper. 4
Kocherlakota, Narayana (2003) “Societal benefits of illiquid bonds,” Journal of Economic
Theory, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 179–193, February. 3
Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) “The Effects of Quantitative
Easing on Long-Term Interest Rates,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 3
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright (2005) “A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and
Policy Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113, No. 3, pp. 463–484, June. 4
Marumo, Kohei, Takashi Nakayama, Shinichi Nishioka, and Toshihiro Yoshida (2003) “Ex-
tracting market expectations on the duration of the zero interest rate policy from Japans
bond prices,” manuscript, Bank of Japan. 3
Modigliani, Franco and Richard Sutch (1966) “Innovations in interest rate policy,” The
American Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 1/2, pp. 178–197. 3
32
(1967) “Debt management and the term structure of interest rates: an empirical
analysis of recent experience,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp.
569–589. 3
Oda, Nobuyuki and Kazuo Ueda (2005) “The effects of the Bank of Japan’s zero interest
rate commitment and quantitative monetary easing on the yield curve: A macro-finance
approach.” 3
Okina, Kunio and Shigenori Shiratsuka (2004) “Policy commitment and expectation for-
mation: Japans experience under zero interest rates,” The North American Journal of
Economics and Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 75–100. 3
Rocheteau, Guillaume and Randall Wright (2005) “Money in Search Equilibrium, in Com-
petitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Econometrica, Vol. 73, No.
1, pp. 175–202. 4
Shi, Shouyong (2008) “Efficiency improvement from restricting the liquidity of nominal
bonds,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 1025 – 1037. 4, 12, 15
Swanson, Eric T, Lucrezia Reichlin, and Jonathan H Wright (2011) “Let’s Twist Again: A
High-Frequency Event-Study Analysis of Operation Twist and Its Implications for QE2
[with Comments and Discussion],” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 151–207.
3
Tobin, James (1969) “A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory,” Journal of
money, credit and banking, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 15–29. 2
Tobin, James and Willem H Buiter (1981) Fiscal and monetary policies, capital formation
and economic activity, No. 523: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale
University. 2
Wallace, Neil (1981) “A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations,” The
American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 267–274, June. 3
Williamson, Stephen D (2012) “Liquidity, monetary policy, and the financial crisis: A New
Monetarist approach,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 6, pp. 2570–2605.
4, 5, 6, 11
Woodford, Michael (2011) Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy:
Princeton University Press. 4
33
